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THE DIALECTIC OF MEMORY AND FORGETTING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

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Annotation:

This article explores the problem of personal identity through the prism of the dialectical relationship between the phenomena of memory and forgetting. John Locke's classic “theory of memory” and David Hume's skeptical critique of it are comparatively analyzed. The main goal of the study is to substantiate that memory is not the creator of personality, but rather the tool that “discovers” it. The article highlights on the basis of scientific evidence that the phenomenon of forgetfulness is not a violation of personality, but a prerequisite for its constructive nature, and that the integrity of the “I” relies not on the accuracy of memory, but on cause-and-effect relationships and the power of imagination.

Keywords: David Hume, John Locke, personal identity, memory, the phenomenon of forgetting, cause-and-effect relationships, psychological continuity, substance, retrospective reconstruction.

The most common and intuitive credible criterion for answering a person's question, “Who am I?” is memory. We consider ourselves to be the same person as yesterday, the past year, and the “I” of childhood because we can remember those times. This view was introduced into scientific circulation in the 17th century by the English philosopher John Locke, who equated the individual with

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a "continuity of consciousness." However, human nature is imperfect, and its integral part is oblivion. If identity is based solely on memory, then isn't "we" non-existent at the time when the events we have forgotten occurred? This paradox was sharply crossed in the 18th century by the Scottish skeptic David Hume. The relevance of this article is that modern psychology and cognitive sciences are increasingly affirming the reconstructive (restorative and changing) nature of human memory. So how do you build a stable personality on top of a changing memory? In this study, we draw on the views of D. Yum to show that the conflict between memory and forgetfulness does not fragment personality, but rather helps to understand our "I" as a complex causal chain.

In covering the topic, the works of representatives of classical empiricism and modern analysts were studied. The idea put forward in John Locke's Essay on the Human Concept is the starting point of the debate over personal identity. For Locke, the individual is not a material body or a spiritual substance, but the mind. According to his famous "The Ethicdoz and the Prince" experience, if the memory of the Ethicdoz is transferred to the Prince's body, he becomes an Ethicdose as a person. In this approach, memory is seen as a factor that creates identity.

Yum's Skeptical Critique: The primary source provided and the commentaries on it show how D. Yum brought Locke's theory into a "blind street." D. Yum in his work "A Treatise on Human Nature" draws attention to the limitations of memory.

- Joseph Butler and Circular Logic: Earlier than Yum, J. Butler had criticized memory theory, saying that memory requires personality (I must first be "I" in order to remember), so memory cannot create identity. Yum develops this idea.

- Yum's Peculiar Approach: The literature states that Yum considers memory to be a sign of personality, not the source of it. He analyzes the phenomenon of forgetting, proving that even if we forget a part of our lives, we are still the same

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person as the person at that time, which means that identity is based on something deeper than memory (causation).

Modern Interpretations: Modern philosophers such as Derek Parfit develop Hume's theory of the "bundle of perceptions" and introduce the concept of "psychological continuity." According to him, memory does not have to be continuous, the important thing is the causal relationship between mental states. This is a logical continuation of Hume's idea that "the individual is the theater of perceptions."

The following scientific methods are used in this article: Dialectical Analysis: Exploring the Conflict Between Memory (Thesis) and Forgetfulness (Antithesis) and Determining Their Role in Personal Identity (Synthesis). Phenomenological reduction: An analysis of the internal structure of the "remember" process. What do we remember: the event itself or our perception of the event? Textual-Contextual Analysis: A comparison of the concepts of "memory reveals identity" and "cause-effect" in D.Yum's "Treatise" and in the presented analytical text. Gedankenexperiment (Thought Experience): A logical analysis of hypothetical situations (memory loss, ring-like perceptions) proposed by Locke and Yum.

KEY PART: ANALYTICS AND RESULTS: The Deconstruction of Substance: The Analogy of the "Theatre" and Its Linguistic Interpretation David Hume, in his Treatise on Human Nature, likens the human mind to the stage of the theatre: "Consciousness is a peculiar theatre in which different perceptions appear in turn, pass, return, and mingle in infinitely different states." However, Yum immediately warns that when we say "theater," we shouldn't mean a building or a stage (an immutable place). There are only "actors" (perceptions). There's no scenery. A linguistic analysis of this analogy leads us to the following conclusions:

1. Reification error: In language, we tend to express processes by nouns. For example, we say: "The wind blows." In fact, there is no such thing as "wind" other than the process of "blowing". Similarly, when we say "I think," we believe that

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there is a separate substance called "I" apart from the process of "thinking." This is the ontological deception that language transmits to us.

2. The problem of static "Have": In grammar, Have (Subject) always precedes Cross-Section (Subject) and is considered stable. In philosophy, too, we think of the "I" as a stable ground that transcends changing experiences. As Yum and later Wittgenstein show, this stability in language does not mean stability in reality. The word "I" is simply a "thread" that is used to tie many experiences together into a single set.

Wittgenstein's "Private Language" Argument and the Social Nature of "I" If Yum saw the "I" as a stream of internal perceptions, L. Wittgenstein takes the issue to the external social environment. His famous "Private Language Argument" shows that there cannot be a language that only one person understands. How does this affect the issue of identity?

- Example of pain: If I say, "I have a toothache," I'm not looking inward and discovering something mysterious. I am applying the rule of language that I have learned in society. When a child cries, adults ask him, "Is your soul hurting?" and the child learns to associate his emotion with the word "I."

- Result: The "I" is not an innate internal emotion, but rather an internalized social tool. By using the word "I," we enter into a system of responsibilities and rights in society. A persona is a "mask" that is worn to become a participant in a social game.

Indexical function: "I" as an indicator In analytic philosophy, it is important to analyze the indexical nature of the pronoun "I", drawing on the ideas of R. Carnap and B. Russell.

-The word "here" refers to a place, but it changes all the time (depending on where I stand).

-The word "now" denotes time, but it changes every second.

-The word "I" is the same thing: it has no permanent content at all. It is simply the speaker's focal point to their own body and speech.

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D. Yum's theory of the "bundle of perceptions" finds its perfect linguistic explanation here: The flow of perceptions is constantly changing, but we use one immutable sign (the word "I") to refer to this flow at any given moment. It reinforces the illusion that we have an "immutable identity."

Narrative Self: The syntactic structure of language from grammar to story compels us not only to create an "I," but to make it a "hero."

- The human brain is adapted to string events into a chain of cause and effect (Hume's laws of association).

- Through language, we express our lives in narrative (narrative) form.

- Any story needs a protagonist. We put the word "I" in the place of that hero.

The analysis shows that the "real I" (ontological) does not exist, but the "narrated I" (narrative) does exist. It is built on the basis of the rules of narrative language. Therefore, an identity crisis (e.g., saying "I lost myself") is actually a discontinuity of the story or a violation of the rules of language.

J. Locke's "The Memory Cage" and The Problem of Forgetting: If, as John Locke said, the "I" consists only of what my conscious memory encompasses, then a serious ontological problem arises. Imagine that a 30-year-old man forgot what happened when he was 10 years old. According to Locke's logic, a 10-year-old and a 30-year-old are two different individuals. This is contrary not only to common sense, but also to legal and ethical norms (is a criminal who forgets the crime exempt from responsibility?).

D. Yum clearly targets this weak point. He believes that our lives are not continuous memory tapes, but ring-and-roll plates. We sleep, we are distracted, we forget. "If we didn't have a memory, we wouldn't have an idea at all... about the chain of causes and actions that constitute ourselves." But D. Yum makes an important correction at this point: memory is needed to see the chain, but memory is not necessary for the chain to exist.

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Yum's Revolution: Memory as a Discoverer: The source under analysis quotes one of D. Yum's most important theses: "Memory does not create personal identity, but only reveals it." What does it mean?

- Creation: If memory creates a person, what I don't remember is not mine.

- Discovery: A person is a chain of events connected by cause and effect.

Memory is the lamp that illuminates the chain. Even if the light goes out (forgetting), the chain remains present in the dark.

For example, I forgot what I ate yesterday. But now I'm fed up and I have the energy. So yesterday's eating (cause) affected my current situation (the aftermath). Even though I don't remember it, my physical and mental state is connected to that event. D. Yum believes that it is this causality that gives us reason to think of ourselves as "one person," and memory only shows us this dependence.

Imagination and Filling in the Gaps: Another genial observation of D. Yum is that imagination fills the gaps in our memory. Our perceptions are in fact rings. The world disappears when we close our eyes, it reappears when we open it. But we consider the world (and ourselves) to be continuous. Why?

D. Yum explains this by "habit" and "imagination activity." We see the similarities between our variable states and become accustomed to stitching them into one thread. Identity, then, is not a rigid fact, but a retrospective reconstruction. Every time we ask, "Who am I?", we construct a narrative (narrative) about ourselves from pieces of memory. Forgetting, on the other hand, allows you to edit the story, remove unnecessary details, and create a "cohesive lens." Paradoxically, forgetfulness helps us maintain our selves, otherwise our brains would be overwhelmed by unnecessary information and the "I" would be shattered.

Affects and Identification: The source states that D. Yum places more emphasis on the identity of affects (emotions) than thought identity. Memory is deceptive, but passions and habits are more stable. A person may not remember an event,

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but feel the fear, love, or hatred that was formed as a result of that event. For example, even if a person who was afraid of water as a child has forgotten about the incident, the habit of being afraid of water persists. For D.Yum, habit and affective memory are a more reliable criterion of identification than intellectual memory.

Conclusion:

Xotira va unutish dialektikasini D. Yum falsafasi asosida tahlil qilish quyidagi yakuniy xulosalarga olib keladi:

1. The secondary role of memory: Unlike John Locke, memory is not the "creator" of personality. It doesn't define existence. Even our past that we can't remember has a causal effect on our present.
2. Identity is a construct: Personal identification is not readily given in nature. It is an intellectual and emotional structure that is created in our minds by combining fragments of memory with the help of the laws of cause and effect and the power of imagination.
3. The Functional Significance of Forgetting: Oblivion is not the loss of the "I." It is the mechanism that allows for the flexibility of the personality. If memory were absolute, man would be deprived of the ability to change and evolve.
4. Psychological Inference: A person's "self" is not in his or her memorization of specific facts, but in the duration of behaviors, habits, and emotional reactions. Identity, then, is a fragile but surprisingly stable edifice built on a field of constant struggle between memory and forgetting. When we wake up every morning, we rebuild this building with the help of our memories and habits, and comfort ourselves, "I am the same."

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