EX-ANTE REGULATION AND PROHIBITED PRACTICES CATALOGUE FOR DIGITAL PLATFORM MARKETS: A POLICY DESIGN APPROACH FOR UZBEKISTAN
- Authors
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Asadulla Qayumov
Independent Researcher, Banking and Finance Academy of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Author
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- Keywords:
- Digital platforms, dominance, abuse of dominant position, ex-ante regulation, prohibited practices, self-preferencing, data control, Uzbekistan.
- Abstract
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This article develops a policy design approach for improving rules that prohibit the abuse of dominant position in digital platform markets in Uzbekistan. The research is based on the dissertation topic concerning dominant digital platforms, network effects, data control, ecosystem dependency and anticompetitive platform conduct. The paper argues that the traditional approach to dominance assessment, which relies mainly on market share or turnover, is insufficient for digital markets because platform power is created through multi-sided interactions, behavioural defaults, data accumulation, switching costs and gatekeeper functions. The aim of the article is to design a structured ex-ante regulation model and a catalogue of prohibited practices that may be applied to large digital platforms without creating excessive administrative burdens for smaller innovators. The methodology combines comparative legal analysis, qualitative coding of foreign enforcement cases and institutional modelling. The results show that Uzbekistan needs a differentiated model that classifies platforms by service type, market dependence, user scale and risk level. The proposed catalogue covers self-preferencing, tying and bundling, anti-steering restrictions, default-setting abuse, exclusivity, discriminatory access to data, interoperability barriers and algorithmic discrimination. The article also proposes an ex-ante notification system, compliance audit, inter-agency information exchange and proportional enforcement tools. The study contributes to digital competition policy by adapting international experience to the institutional realities of a developing digital economy.
- References
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- Published
- 2026-06-09
- Issue
- Vol. 2 No. 6 (2026)
- Section
- Articles
- License
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.








